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DO GIRSH AND MT. LAUREL COMPEL THE
ZONING OF A FAIR SHARE OF ACREAGE
FOR APARTMENT USE? PENNSYLVANIA
SAYS YES
The 1970's have witnessed a sudden but not unexpected increase
in the judicial shaping of land use policies. This development can be
attributed chiefly to an increased awareness of the acute shortage of
low and moderate income' housing in suburban areas and to legal
challenges 2 to exclusionary zoning schemes. 3 Several state courts have
1. The definition of "low and moderate income" is usually conditioned upon various
social and economic factors. The United States Supreme Court recently grappled with
the phrase in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,494 n.5 (1975). See also Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 158 n.2, 336 A.2d 713, 716
n.2, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), citing Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 445, 320 A.2d 223, 227 (L. Div. 1974), modified and aff'd,
- N.J. -, - A.2d - (1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan. 26, 1977); Urban League v. Mayor &
Council (Carteret), 142 N.J. Super. 11, -, 359 A.2d 526, 542 (Ch. 1976).
2. Land use regulations which adversely affect the poor have been challenged under
the Warren Court's "new equal protection." See, e.g., Michelman, Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 769 (1969); Note, The Constitution-
ality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 (1970). These challenges have argued that the
effect of exclusionary zoning practices has been to confine the poor to the inner city,
denying them equal housing and employment opportunities through racial and economic
discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
E.g., Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v.
City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970). Cf. United States v. City of Black Jack,
508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (Title VIII, federal fair
housing laws); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (state constitutional grounds).
Two recent Supreme Court decisions have seriously undermined the federal equal
protection attack. See Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights,
97 S. Ct. 555 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
3. Exclusionary zoning regulations operate to maintain or increase housing costs at a
level which is prohibitive to persons with low or moderate income. Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,159, 336 A.2d 713,717, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). See generally R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY
ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970's at 3 (1973). Exclusionary
zoning commonly occurs in suburban municipalities which surround urban core cities.
See NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 1, 40-53,
211-18 (1968); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT
HOME 139-40 (1969).
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responded to these challenges by reprimanding municipalities and rec-
ommending broad criteria for communities to consider when revising
their zoning ordinances.4 In Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale
Farms, Inc. ,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held a township zoning
ordinance invalid as exclusionary.6 In allowing this characterization to
determine the result without analyzing the criteria which it used to
reach its conclusion, the court may have invalidated a zoning ordi-
nance which was not in fact exclusionary.
In Willistown plaintiff-developer proposed to build apartments on
a parcel of land located in the township.7 The township zoning ordi-
nance had been amended in accordance with the landmark Pennsyl-
vania case Appeal of Girsh8 to permit apartments in an eighty acre
area. This area did not, however, include plaintiff-developer's land.9
After his request for a building permit was denied by the local zoning
Exclusionary land use controls include large lot zoning (e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v.
Town of Sanbornton, 338 F. Supp. 301 (D.N.H. 1972)), prohibition of mobile homes
(e.g., Matthews v. Fayette County, 233 Ga. 220, 210 S.E.2d 758 (1974)), bedroom
limitations (e.g., Molino v. Mayor & Council, 116 N.J. Super. 195,281 A.2d 401 (L. Div.
1971)), minimum floor space requirements (e.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of
Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953)),
prohibition of apartments (e.g., Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970)), and
minimum lot size requirements (e.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504,215
A.2d 597 (1965)). Other exclusionary techniques include maximum height regulations,
minimum setback requirements, architectural controls, spot zoning, and the use of
special exceptions and variances. See generally Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic
Exclusionary Zoning: The Beginning of the End?, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 9; Carter, Bert &
Nobert, Local Government Techniques for Managing Growth, II MANAGEMENT & CON-
TROL OF GROWTH 330 (R. Scott ed. 1975); Freilich, Development Timing, Moratoria and
Controlling Growth: Preliminary Report, II MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH 361
(R. Scott ed. 1975); Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case,
66 HARV. L. REV. 1051 (1953); Scott, Exclusion and Land Use: A Comment and Research
Bibliography, I MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH 445 (R. Scott ed. 1975); Com-
ment, A Survey of the Judicial Responses to Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV.
537, 538-62 (1971).
4. E.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Waynesborough Corp. v. Easttown
Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 137, 350 A.2d 895 (1976).
5. - Pa. -, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
6. Id. at -, 341 A.2d at 467.
7. Id. at -, 341 A.2d at 467.
8. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (zoning ordinance which totally excluded apart-
ments held unconstitutional). Before Girsch no zoning district in the township of Willis-
town permitted apartment uses. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text infra.
9. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 467. For a discussion of the problems associated with
developers' claims for site-specific relief in exclusionary zoning cases see Hyson, The
Problem of Relief in Developer-Initiated Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 12 URBAN L.
ANN. 21, 27-30 (1976).
[Vol. 13:277
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol13/iss1/17
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
hearing board,'0 the developer appealed to the court of common pleas
which upheld the hearing board decision but declared the amended
zoning ordinance unconstitutional." The commonwealth court af-
firmed. 12 On allocatur, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the re-
zoning to be "mere tokenism" in violation of the restrictions on
exclusionary land use regulations set forth in Girsh 3 and " 'exclusio-
nary' in that it does not provide for a fair share of the township acreage
for apartment construction."14 The court directed that zoning approval
be granted and that a building permit be issued to plaintiff-developer.15
10. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 467. The developer's first application for a building
permit was rejected under the township's pre-Girsh zoning ordinance which did not
permit apartments. The second application was refused because the new zoning ordi-
nance was pending. For a discussion of the "pending ordinance" doctrine, see Boron Oil
Co. v. Kimple, I Pa. Commw. Ct. 55, 275 A.2d 406 (1970), aff'd, 445 Pa. 327, 284 A.2d
744 (1971). After the new zoning ordinance was passed, the zoning board denied the
developer a variance.
11. Appeal of Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 19 Ches. Co. Rep. 271, 273-74 (C.P. 1971),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 453, 300 A.2d 107 (1973), aff'd, -
Pa. -, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
12. WillistownTwp. v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 453,300 A.2d 107
(1973), affl'd, - Pa. -, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
13. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 467. The commonwealth court stated "we are brought
face to face with the most compelling problem posed by the Girsh case: If total
prohibition of apartments within a municipality is not to be countenanced, at what point
short of total prohibition will a township be found to have met its responsibility to the
community at large. . . ." 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 468, 300 A.2d at 115.
14. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 467. The court noted that less than one percent of the
township's total acreage was zoned to permit apartments. See notes 40 & 41 and
accompanying text infra. Cf. Waynesborough Corp. v. Easttown Twp. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 137, 350 A.2d 895 (1976) (less than one percent of township land
was not reasonable provision for apartment use); but cf. Kaiserman v. Springfield Twp.,
22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 287, 348 A.2d 467 (1975) (10.4% of township land was zoned to
permit apartments but less than 1% was actually available for development; ordinance
did not represent "token" compliance with Girsh); Sullivan v. Board of Supervisors, 22
Pa. Commw. Ct. 318, 348 A.2d 464 (1975) (one percent of township land zoned for
commercial development was not invalid as "token" amount of land for such permis-
sible use; no impermissible exclusionary effect).
15. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 468-69. Whether this kind of relief is within the power of
the court and an appropriate remedy is very controversial. See Hyson, supra note 9, at
43 & nn.87-88. Compare Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 191, 336 A.2d 713, 734, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Chief
Justice Hall, writing for the majority, invalidated only that part of the township ordi-
nance found to be exclusionary and permitted the township to amend its ordinance in
light of the opinion), with id. at 735-36 (Pashman, J., concurring) (Justice Pashman would
have the court go further in actual implementation of the principles of Mount Laurel and
establish broad guidelines for judicial review of municipal zoning decisions which
implicate exclusionary zoning abuses). See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, - N.J. -, -, - A.2d -, - (1977) (No. A-80181, Jan. 26, 1977) (the court
noted that more effective relief would be necessary to ensure developer permission to
build and compared the case with Mount Laurel).
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Zoning in the United States was not legally recognized until 1926
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 16 in which the United States
Supreme Court upheld the authority of a municipality to regulate land
use as a valid exercise of police power. 17 The principles of Euclid,
which accord zoning ordinances a presumption of validity'8 and apply
the traditional police power test for validity, 19 have shaped zoning
litigation for decades. Almost all zoning classifications have been
upheld by courts20 whioh have viewed "general welfare" in a geo-
graphically narrow, local context. 21 In 1965, however, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in National Land and Investment Co. v. East-
16. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
17. Id. at 397.
18. Id. at 388.
19. Id. at 387, 395. Under the police power test the zoning ordinance must promote
the public health, safety or general welfare; if it does not, it is invalid.
20. Before 1965, Pennsylvania courts routinely deferred to local zoning legislation
and decisions. E.g., Appeal of Key Realty Co., 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962); Swade
v. Springfield Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 269, 140 A.2d 597 (1958); cf.
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965) (court
applied the presumption of validity test but found that challenger had met its burden of
proof). See also Washburn, Apartments in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74
DICK. L. REV. 634 (1970); Comment, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusionary
Suburban Zoning: From Bilbar to Girsh-A Decade of Change, 16 VILL. L. REV. 507
(1971).
21. Because zoning was to serve local needs, "general welfare" was interpreted to
refer to the welfare of the enacting municipality, not the welfare of neighboring areas or
nonresidents. The restricted concept of the general welfare plus the presumption of
validity made successful challenge of exclusionary zoning in the courts nearly
impossible.
Euclid established a reasonableness standard for constitutional attacks on zoning
ordinances. Until recently, however, standing to challenge these ordinances was granted
only to those persons who had suffered an injury, i.e. the adversely affected landowner.
Nonresident standing to challenge exclusionary zoning in federal court was sharply
restricted by Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See Commonwealth v. County of
Bucks, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974)
(state court denial of standing to nonresident challengers). See generally BABCOCK &
BOSSELMAN, supra note 3, ch. 2; Hyson, supra note 9, at 22-23; Note, Alternatives to
Warth v. Seldin: The Potential Resident Challenger of an Exclusionary Zoning Scheme,
11 URBAN L. ANN. 223 (1976).
Occasionally a judge or commentator has recognized that zoning ordinances may have
an effect on persons other than local landowners. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926); Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232,252, 181
A.2d 129, 140 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963) (Hall, J., dissenting); Fanale v.
Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958); Bilbar Constr. Co. v.
Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 77, 141 A.2d 851, 859 (1958) (Bell, J.,
dissenting). See also Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case,
66 HARv. L. REV. 1051 (1953); Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 317 (1955).
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town Township Board of Adjustment22 held a township zoning ordi-
nance unconstitutional because of its restrictive effect on population
growth, 23 stating that "the general welfare is not fostered or promoted
by a zoning ordinance designed to be exclusive or exclusionary.' '24
Appeal of Girsh25 relied upon National Land and held a zoning ordi-
nance that totally excluded apartment use unconstitutional. 26 The court
found apartments to be a legitimate land use which must reasonably be
provided for in the township zoning scheme. 27
The more recent exclusionary zoning cases have examined the
effects of zoning ordinances from a regional perspective. 28 The courts
consider a wider range of interests, including those of neighboring
communities and potential residents, to be within the general welfare
when reviewing challenged zoning ordinances. 29 New Jersey has been
at the center of exclusionary zoning litigation.3 In Southern Burlington
22. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1971).
23. The suburban township was directly in the path of population expansion from
Philadelphia and had enacted a four-acre minimum lot size provision. Id. at 528, 215
A.2d at 610. Accord, Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466,268 A.2d 765 (1970)
(two and three acre minimum lot size ordinance held invalid).
24. 419 Pa. at 533, 215 A.2d at 612.
25. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
26. Id. at 245,263 A.2d at 398-99. In Girsh the developer proposed to build apartment
buildings but the township zoning ordinance did not permit apartment uses anywhere in
the township. The township refused to rezone developer's land. The court declared the
total exclusion (the court did not consider the theoretical availability of a variance to be
curative) of apartments to be unconstitutional.
27. Id. at 244-45, 263 A.2d at 398-99. The court based its decision in part on the lack
of regional consideration in zoning and planning.
[P]erhaps in an ideal world, planning and zoning would be done on a regional basis,
so that a given community would have apartments, while an adjoining community
would not. But as long as we allow zoning to be done community by community, it
is intolerable to allow one municipality (or many municipalities) to close its doors at
the expense of surrounding municipalities and the central city.
Id. at 245 n.4, 263 A.2d at 399 n.4 (emphasis in original).
28. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, - N.J. -, -, - A.2d
- (1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan. 26, 1977) (slip op. at 36 ); Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 174-81, 336 A.2d 713, 725-28, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Urban League v. Mayor & Council (Carteret), 142 N.J.
Super. 11, 359 A.2d 526 (Ch. 1976); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268
A.2d 765 (1970); Appeal of Girsch, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Waynesborough
Corp. v. Easttown Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 137, 350 A.2d 895
(1976). See generally Moskowitz, Regional Housing Allocation Plans: A Case History of
the Delaware Valley Regional Plan, 7 URB. LAW. 292 (1975); Rubinowitz, Exclusionary
Zoning: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 625 (1973).
29. See generally BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN, supra note 3, ch.2.
30. E.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,- N.J.-, -,A.2d-
(1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan. 26, 1977); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
1977]
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County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,31 the New Jersey
Supreme Court declared a municipal zoning ordinance invalid because
the ordinance denied "the opportunity for an appropriate variety and
choice of housing for all categories of people who may desire to live
there, of course including those of low and moderate income." 32 The
court refused to allow the municipality to "build a wall around itself" 3
through its land use regulations and imposed an affirmative obligation 34
upon every "developing municipality" 35 to afford decent and adequate
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Rutgers
Univ. v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972); Kunzler v. Hoffman, 48 N.J. 277, 225
A.2d 321 (1966); Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963); Duffcon Concrete Prod., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, I
N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
31. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
32. Id. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731-32. The court in Mount Laurel noted that "proper
provision for adequate housing of all categories of people is certainly an absolute
essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use regulations,"
67 N.J. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727, and that the need for housing is so "important and of
such broad public interest that the general welfare which developing municipalities...
must consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot be parochially confined to
the claimed good of the particular municipality." Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727-28 (em-
phasis added). Cf. Kunzler v. Hoffman, 48 N.J. 277, 288, 225 A.2d 321,327 (1966) (local
zoning authorities are not limited to a consideration of only those benefits to the general
welfare which would be received by residents of municipality in granting use variance to
private hospital for emotionally disturbed); Roman Catholic Diocese v. Ho-Ho-Kus
Borough, 47 N.J. 211, 218, 220 A.2d 97, 101 (1966) (local action with respect to private
educational projects largely benefiting those residing outside the borough must be
exercised with due concern for values which transcend municipal lines).
33. 67 N.J. at 171, 336 A.2d at 723.
34. Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 728. This affirmative obligation requires the municipality
to provide, by its land use regulations, a reasonable opportunity for varied types of
housing for persons at all levels of income. Id. This affirmative obligation has two
aspects-procedural and substantive. Procedurally, a showing that a "developing munic-
ipality in its land use regulations has not made realistically possible a variety and choice
of housing" which includes low and moderate income housing will shift the burden of
proof to the municipality to justify its regulations. Id. at 180-81, 336 A.2d at 728.
Particular land use regulations and the facts and circumstances that will sustain the
municipality's burden of proof are the substantive aspect and will vary from case to
case. Id. at 181, 336 A.2d at 728. Cf. Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms,
Inc., - Pa. -, -, 341 A.2d 465, 470 (1975) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting) (presumption of
validity attaches to a zoning ordinance and burden of proof is upon party challenging the
ordinance).
35. 67 N.J. at 160, 336 A.2d at 717. Those municipalities which contain undeveloped
land and are in the path of future residential, commercial and industrial growth may be
characterized as "developing." The court specifically excluded central cities, older
built-up suburbs and areas likely to remain rural from the concept of "developing
municipality." Id. Cf. Urban League v. Mayor & Council (Carteret), 142 N.J. Super. 11,
27, 359 A.2d 526, 536 (Ch. 1976) (the court used a comparative statistic of "gross vacant
acreage suitable for housing" that excluded environmentally critical land, land reason-
ably zoned for industrial and commercial uses and all farmland in present use to
[Vol. 13:277
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low and moderate income housing at least to the extent of the "munici-
pality's fair share of the present and prospective regional need
therefor.' 36
Mount Laurel left several questions unanswered: how to actually
determine "regional need" and "fair share" 37 and the extent to which
determine which municipalities in the county fit within the developing municipality
status). See Rose & Levin, What is a 'Developing Municipality' within the Meaning of
the Mount Laurel Decision?, 4 REAL ESTATE L.J. 359 (1976).
36. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724. This qualification of the municipality's affirma-
tive obligation is critical. The extent of the obligation to provide low and moderate
income housing will depend upon the definition of region, determination of regional need
and calculation of each municipality's fair share. See generally Ackerman, The Mount
Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1;
Degraff, Exclusionary Zoning: The View from Mount Laurel, 40 ALB. L. REv. 646
(1976); 27 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., no. 6 (1975); note 38 infra. It is important to note
that Mount Laurel represented a significant step to housing and zoning reform advocates
because the judiciary was compelled to intervene in the public interest in exclusionary
zoning as it had done in other controversial social areas. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (desegregation in public education). But
see Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 97 S. Ct. 555
(1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Evans v. Hills, 537 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1976)
(en banc), rev'g Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1975).
37. The New Jersey and Pennsylvania courts seem to have taken different ap-
proaches in their analysis of region and fair share. Justice Hall in Mount Laurel noted
that the composition of the applicable "region" would vary from case to case. 67 N.J. at
189, 336 A.2d at 733. Compare Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, -
N.J. -, -, - A.2d -, - (1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan. 26, 1977) (slip op. at 36) (concept of
region as housing market); Urban League v. Mayor & Council (Carteret), 142 N.J.
Super. 11, 19-23, 359 A.2d 526, 531-32 (Ch. 1976) (Middlesex County designated as the
region for the purpose of the litigation), with Waynesborough Corp. v. Easttown Twp.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 137,350 A.2d 895 (1976) (township); Kaiserman
v. Springfield Twp., 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 287, 348 A.2d 467 (1975) (township); Sullivan v.
Board of Supervisors, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 318, 348 A.2d 464 (1975) (township). Cf.
Commonwealth v. County of Bucks, 9 Pa. Commw. Ct. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974) (dismissal of nonresident attack on validity of zoning
ordinances of all 54 townships in Bucks County; court noted that plaintiffs demanded
"ongoing and continuing" relief).
Although the fair share language of the Mount Laurel opinion was extensively cited,
the Willistown court apparently considered only the percentage of township acreage
zoned to permit apartment use to support its finding of exclusionary zoning. - Pa. at -,
341 A.2d at 468. The Pennsylvania commonwealth court, however, in Waynesborough
Corp. v. Easttown Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 137, 350 A.2d 895
(1976), set forth several additional factors to consider-the nature of the land made
available, the prior history of zoning within the township (whether the ordinance repre-
sents a reasonable effort at compliance), and whether the township is a "logical place for
development to take place." Id. at 142-43, 350 A.2d at 898, citing Appeal of Girsh, 437
Pa. 237, 245, 263 A.2d 395, 398 (1970).
In Mount Laurel the court stated that the housing needs of low and moderate income
persons residing within the township and such persons presently employed or reasonable
expected to be employed would be relevant in any determination of a municipality's fair
share. 67 N.J. at 189-90, 336 A.2d at 733. Subsequent cases and commentators have tried
to actually determine fair share. In Carteret the court made a factual finding as to the
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courts should grant affirmative relief in exclusionary zoning cases.38
These issues were raised but not confronted in Willistown,39 which was
based almost entirely on Girsh and Mount Laurel. The court found
that "the rezoning of only eighty acres out of 11,589 acres in the
township constitute[d] 'tokenism,' and [was] an exclusionary land use
restriction not meeting the Girsh standard." 40 The court then relied on
Mount Laurel to hold that the township zoning ordinance continued to
be exclusionary because "it did not provide for a fair share of the
township acreage for apartment construction. 41
The court's characterization of the township's rezoning as an
unacceptable token response to Girsh is questionable. 42 Girsh simply
countywide low and moderate income housing need projected to 1985 with deductions
for rehabilitated and projected housing to be built under revised zoning ordinances. 142
N.J. Super. at 35-38, 359 A.2d at 541. Then an initial fair share allocation was made to
bring each defendant municipality (only 11 of the 23 municipalities in Middlesex County
were found to have adequate vacant land suitable for housing development) up to the
county proportion of 15% low and 19% moderate income population. Id. The balance of
the county projected housing need of 14,667 units was then apportioned equally among
the 11 defendant municipalities, approximately 1333 per municipality. Id. The court did
not feel that any special factors (availability of land suitable for residential development,
environmental considerations, relative access to employment) justified a deviation from
this allocation. Id. at 37-39, 359 A.2d at 542; cf. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township
of Madison, - N.J. -, - A.2d - (1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan. 26, 1977 (slip op. at 70-71)
(setting gross regional goals but declining to fix a fair share quota for each township).
The criteria which have been frequently discussed by commentators to allocate a
municipality's fair share include housing responsibility based on need, the achievement
of racial and economic integration, the premise that an equal share is fair share,
population proportions, proportion of existing jobs, proportion of future jobs, suitability
of the particular municipality for low and moderate income housing, and the obligation
that every municipality take care of the housing needs of its own constitutents. See
Share Allocation Plans: Which Formula Will Pacify the Contentious Suburbs?, 12
URBAN L. ANN. 3 (1976). See also L. RUBINOWITZ, LOW-INCOME HOUSING: SUBURBAN
STRATEGIES 267-85 (1974); Brooks, Lower-Income Housing: The Planner's Response,
ASPO REP. No. 282 (July-Aug. 1972); Listokin, Fair Share Housing Distribution: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come?, in INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, NEW JERSEY
TRENDS 353 (1974); Listokin, Fair-Share Housing Distribution: Will It Open the Suburbs
to Apartment Development?, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 739 (1974); Lustig & Pack, A Standard
for Residential Zoning Based on the Location of Jobs, 40 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 333
(1974); Moskowitz, supra note 28; Rose, The Mount Laurel Decision: Is It Based on
Wishful Thinking?, 4 REAL ESTATE L.J. 61 (1975).
38. See note 15 supra. See Hyson, supra note 9; Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial
Remedies in Cases of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MICH. L. REV. 760 (1976); notes 58 & 64
infra.
39. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 468.
40. Id. at -, 341 A.2d at 467.
41. Id. at-, 341 A.2d at 468.
42. Id. at -, 341 A.2d at 467. The exact holding in Girsh was that a township
"cannot have a zoning scheme that makes no reasonable provision for apartment uses."
437 Pa. at 243, 263 A.2d at 398 (emphasis added). See note 37 supra. Arguably the
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held a total exclusion of apartment use to be an impermissible restraint
on population growth, and required zoning schemes to make "reason-
able provision" for such uses.43 The Willistown court apparently con-
sidered an eighty acre rezoning (less than one percent of the total
township acreage) to be unreasonable and tantamount to a total exclu-
sion under Girsh.44 The dissent, however, noted that the rezoning for
apartment use in the predominantly rural township would have pro-
vided for the construction of 800 to 1040 apartment units which could
have housed 1600 to 3120 persons.45 The 3120-person figure repre-
sented a potential increase of over one third the township population at
the time of rezoning, 46 which is arguably neither a token increase nor a
de facto exclusion.
The courts have attempted to substantively define regional need
and fair share.47 Mount Laurel and several recent Pennsylvania cases
Pennsylvania Supreme Court should have examined the actual circumstances in Willis-
town more fully and determined whether in fact the district was a reasonable provision
for apartment uses. The opinion of the commonwealth court is more instructive. It noted
that there was a regional housing shortage (the region was Chester County) and stated
that such a small apartment use district was merely a token response to Girsh. 7 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 453, 469-73, 300 A.2d 107, 115-17 (1973), aff'd, - Pa. -, 341 A.2d 465
(1975).
43. 437 Pa. at 243, 263 A.2d at 398. See notes 37 & 42 supra.
44. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 467-68.
45. Id. at - n.3, 341 A.2d at 469 n.3 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at -, 341 A.2d at 469. The township defended its amended zoning ordinance
as an attempt to control its growth. Brief for Appellant at 9-14, Township of Willistown
v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., - Pa. -, 341 A.2d 465 (1975). Mount Laurel did not present
the question of the validity of growth control in a developing municipality but indicated
that growth control might be permissible if not utilized as an exclusionary device. 67 N.J.
at 188 n.20, 336 A.2d at 732 n.20. Growth control techniques have withstood several
recent challenges. See, e.g., Construction Ind. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Associated Home Builders of the
Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, - Cal. 3d - , 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr.
41 (1976); Golden v. City of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291,334 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1972); cf. Sullivan v. Board of Supervisors, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 318, 348 A.2d 464 (1975)
(regulation of commerical rather than residential growth). See generally Carter, Bert &
Nobert, supra note 3; Freilich, supra note 3; Note, A Zoning Program for Phased
Growth: Ramapo Township's Time Controls on Residential Development, 47 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 723 (1972); Note, Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo & Sequence of Land
Development, 26 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1974).
47. 67 N.J. at 190, 336 A.2d at 733; see note 37 supra. But see Oakwood at Madison,
Inc. v. Township of Madison, - N.J.-,-, -A.2d-, -(1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan. 26,
1977) (slip op. at 14-16) (court does not mandate formula approach to fair share allocation
but instead defers to administrative agencies in regulation of housing distribution);
Urban League v. Mayor & Council (Carteret), 142 N.J. Super. 11, 35-39, 359 A.2d 526,
541-42 (Ch. 1976) (use of numerical housing need figures and formula approach to
allocate fair share).
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have applied socioeconomic criteria 48 to determine a municipality's fair
share of low and moderate income housing. Mount Laurel, however,
considered "fair share" in the context of "regional need." '49 The
Willistown court did not consider regional housing needs but instead
looked only to the fact that less than one percent of the township
acreage was zoned to permit apartments.50 While the use of this crite-
rion to determine fair share may be consistent with the Girsh opinion,5 1
such a determination which is based solely on the percentage of town-
ship acreage is arguably inconsistent with the principles of Mount
Laurel.5 2
48. See note 37 supra.
49. 67 N.J. at 173-74, 190, 336 A.2d at 724, 733 (suggesting a flexible fair share
approach which did not contemplate equal allocation among the municipalities within a
given region); cf. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, - N.J. -, -
A.2d - (1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan. 26, 1977) (flexible approach); Urban League v. Mayor
& Council (Carteret), 142 N.J. Super. 11, 359 A.2d 526 (Ch. 1976) (formula approach).
See also Hanson, Growth Control: The Role of Regionism, III MANAGEMENT & CONTROL
OF GROWTH 293 (R. Scott ed. 1975); Rose, The Mount Laurel Decision: Is It Based on
Wishful Thinking?, supra note 37; Rose, Exclusionary Zoning and Managed Growth:
Unresolved Issues, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 689, 717-20 (1975).
50. - Pa. at - , 341 A.2d at 468.
51. See notes 37 & 42 supra.
52. Mount Laurel stated "[i]n arriving at such a fair share determination . . . the
housing needs of persons of low and moderate income now or formerly residing in the
township in substandard dwellings and those presently employed. . . will be pertinent."
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 189-90,
336 A.2d 713, 733, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). The Willistown court did not
consider these factors in its determination of "fair share." The New Jersey cases have
used a more complex approach in the analysis of exclusionary zoning than the Pennsyl-
vania cases. In a Mount Laurel-type analysis the court must make several threshold
determinations involving rather sophisticated planning and zoning considerations-
definition of region, regional housing need, characteristics of the land under considera-
tion, comprehensive review of the entire zoning ordinance, regional patterns of develop-
ment and growth. In contrast the approach of the Pennsylvania courts has been more
simplistic. For example, until recently the Pennsylvania cases examined the zoning
ordinances of the defending township without detailed consideration of the status of the
municipality (whether developing, fully developed or rural) or the relationship between
the township and neighboring municipalities in terms of suitability to accommodate
population expansion. By not considering the special characteristics of the particular
township, the Pennsylvania approach has not been restricted to developing
municipalities only and should therefore be more effective in forcing revision of ex-
clusionary land regulations. Such an approach is, however, somewhat difficult to recon-
cile with rational planning and zoning and growth control strategies. See Mandelker, The
Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 899,
922-41 (1976); note 46 supra. The Pennsylvania courts are beginning to take a more
sophisticated approach. Waynesborough has elaborated on certain relevant considera-
tions for review of allegedly exclusionary zoning ordinances and in the process has
qualified the absolute "percentage" approach of Willistown. 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. at
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The courts have also promoted the rational estimation of regional
need and fair share by regional and state planning commissions,
which would also reduce the participation of the judiciary as a "super-
planning agency" in the planning process.5 4 The Willistown court,
however, neither recognized nor examined a regional housing plan or a
pending county housing plan in its evaluation of the amended zoning
ordinance. 5
The transformation of a courtroom victory into actual housing has
142-44, 350 A.2d at 898. Sullivan has distinguished commercial from residential
exclusionary zoning--explicitly limiting the reasonable provision mandate of Girsh to
residential uses. 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 323-24, 348 A.2d at 467. These recent cases
indicate a moderation of the Willistown "percentage" interpretation of Girsh. But see
Hyson, supra note 9, at 34-35 & n.60; Williams, Doughty & Potter, Exclusionary Zoning
Strategies: Effective Lawsuit Goals and Criteria, I MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF
GROWTH 477, 485-87 (R. Scott ed. 1975) (contrasting the "Pennsylvania rationale" with
the "'sensible rationale" of the New Jersey courts).
53. See Listokin, Fair-Share Housing Distribution: Will It Open the Suburbs to
Apartment Development?, supra note 37, at 74041 (governmental and institutional
bodies that have developed fair share plans). But see Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v.
Township of Madison, - N.J. -, - n.43, - A.2d -, - n.43 (1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan.
26, 1977) (slip op. at 73 n.43) (critical evaluation of use of planning studies); Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 170-71, 336 A.2d
713, 723, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (court noted lack of effective inter-municipal
or area planning or land use regulation). Massachusetts has enacted an "anti-snob
zoning" law under which local land use controls can be overridden on appeal and
thereby force a local community to assume its fair share of low and moderate income
housing. MASS. ANN. LAws, ch. 408, §§ 20-23 (MichielLaw. Co-op Supp. 1974). The
Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission (Philadelphia metropolitan area) can
withhold A-95 approval and prevent distribution of state funds if a county has not made
provisions for its fair share allocation. Upper St. Clair Twp. v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 71, 317 A.2d 906 (1974); see Brussat, A-95 Review System: Can Be an
Asset, III MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH 298 (R. Scott ed. 1975); Moskowitz,
supra note 28.
Many commentators have advocated regional planning. See, e.g., Mandelker, The
Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 899
(1976); Marcus, Exclusionary Zoning: The Need for a Regional Planning Context, 16
N.Y.L.F. 731 (1970); Rose, From the Legislatures: State Government Role in Land Use
Planning & Control is Growing, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 809 (1974). Some commentators
have suggested that a regional planning approach may actually operate to reinforce the
status quo. See, e.g., Burchell, Listokin & James, Exclusionary Zoning: Pitfalls of the
Regional Remedy, 7 URB. LAW. 262 (1975); Parker, Regional Imperatives & Managed
Growth, III MANAGEMENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH 284, 285 (R. Scott ed. 1975) (must
reconcile regional problems with jurisdictional solutions).
54. The federal courts are reluctant to become super-planning agencies. See, e.g.,
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974);
Evans v. Hills, 537 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc); Construction Ind. Ass'n v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). State courts
have not been so reticent. See note 37 supra.
55. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 468.
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been rare. 56 Since municipal legislation is necessarily local in scope, it
has been difficult to persuade local planning and zoning officials to
consider the needs of "outsiders" or nonresidents. 57 The courts have
acknowledged this practical limitation on the granting of effective
relief in exclusionary zoning cases. 58 Controvery has developed over
the extent to which courts should order affirmative relief.59 The court
in Willistown granted zoning approval to plaintiff-developer 6w and di-
rected that a building permit be issued, contingent upon developer
"compliance with the administrative requirements of the zoning ordi-
nance and other reasonable controls."61 This affirmative order is par-
ticularly effective relief62 and favorable to the developer. 63
56. None of the developers in National Land, Kit-Mar Builders, or Girsh were able
to proceed with the proposed development.
57. See note 37 supra.
58. See generally Hyson, supra note 9; Mallach, Do Lawsuits Build Housing? The
Implications of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 653 (1975); Mytelka &
Mytelka, Exclusionary Zoning: A Consideration of Remedies, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 1
(1975); Rose, The Mount Laurel Decision: Is It Based on Wishful Thinking?, supra note
37; Rubinowitz, Exclusionary Zoning: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 6 MICH. J.L.
REF. 625 (1973); Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases of Exclusionary
Zoning, supra note 38; Note, A Wrong Without a Remedy: Judicial Approaches to
Exclusionary Zoning, 6 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 727 (1975); Note, Beyond Invalidation: The
Judicial Power to Zone, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 159 (1975).
The New Jersey Supreme Court finally became impatient with the progress of the
Oakwood at Madison litigation and doubtful about adequate developer relief under the
Mount Laurel type remedy. The court was therefore more forceful in its remedial order
in Oakwood at Madison. Compare Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,
- N.J. -, -, - A.2d -, - (1977) (No. A-80/81, Jan. 26, 1977) (slip op. at 94-97), with
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 191-92,
336 A.2d 713, 734, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
59. See Hyson, supra note 9; Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases of
Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 38. Compare Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)
(Hall, J., writing for the majority), with id. at 208-09, 336 A.2d at 743 (Pashman, J.,
concurring); Urban League v. Mayor & Council (Carteret), 142 N.J. Super. 11,359 A.2d
526 (Ch. 1976). The court in Oakwood at Madison followed the remedial posture of the
majority in Mount Laurel but directed that the developer be granted development
permission in this particular case. - N.J. at-, - A.2d at - (slip op. at 90-97).
60. - Pa. at -, 341 A.2d at 468.
61. Id. at -, 341 A.2d at 469.
62. Pennsylvania courts do have the power to authorize this type of specific relief.
Municipalities Planning Code § 1011, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (Purdon 1972).
63. It is unlikely that the proposed development will in fact provide low and moderate
income housing. Chesterdale's own architect has described the proposed apartment
complex as a "middle to high income" development. Chesterdale Farms, Inc. v. Willis-
town Twp., 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 453, 486, 300 A.2d 107, 124 (1973), (Wilkinson, J., in
support of affirming in part and reversing in part), aff'd, - Pa. -, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
National Land, Kit-Mar Builders and Girsh clearly referred to the exclusion of low and
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Willistown may represent an overreaction of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court to the frustration of its decision in Girsh" and to the
attention given to Mount Laurel. While a charge of "tokenism" is
undoubtedly valid in some circumstances, it is possible that the court
has misapplied this characterization in Willistown. Willistown Town-
ship may have in fact complied with the mandate of Girsh.65 However,
the validity of a finding of exclusionary purpose and effect based
solely on the acreage allotted for apartment use is questionable. 66
Consideration of percentage of township land alone is an inadequate
basis from which to determine fair share or regional need.67
Marc Chalfen
moderate income housing in speaking of the "reluctance of rural communities to absorb
their fair share of the load." Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 475, 268 A.2d
765, 769 (1970).
64. The court declared the ordinance invalid but did not retain jurisdiction. The
township amended the ordinance to zone a quarry for apartment use, complying with the
court's mandate while preserving the exclusionary effect. The developer then petitioned
the court for further relief; the court granted the petition. Order No. MP-12, 271 (Aug.
29, 1972) (unpublished). See Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219,-, 328 A.2d 464,
468 (1974).
65. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
66. See notes 42, 49 & 55 supra. One commentator has stated:
The Mount Laurel case does contain one somber note of caution to those who
might contemplate similar cases in other state jurisdictions. One cannot read that
opinion without an awareness of the care with which the plaintiffs did their
homework. The court has at hand a comprehensive brief on what was happening to
housing patterns and job locations in New Jersey. The same quality of data
gathering and analysis is an essential predicate to a similar result in any other state.
Babcock, On the Choice of Forum, 27 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 7,7-8 (No. 6, 1975).
67. Subsequent Pennsylvania cases seem to have recognized this. In Benham v.
Board of Supervisors, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 245, 349 A.2d 484 (1975), plaintiff filed for a
curative amendment, challenging the township zoning ordinance because it prohibited
townhouse development. The court upheld the ordinance, noting that the township had
provided for its fair share of regional housing needs as projected for 1990 by the
Delaware County Planning Commission. Id. at 253, 349 A.2d at 489. Accord, Applica-
tion of Maida Blouch, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 362 A.2d 1139 (1976). But see Camp Hill
Dev. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 519, 319 A.2d 197 (1974)
(zoning ordinance which made no provision for townhouse use was invalid). In DeCaro
v. Washington Twp., 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 252, 344 A.2d 725 (1975), plaintiffs argued that
an exclusionary zoning scheme was invalid, citing Willistown. The court held that
plaintiffs had not met the burden of proof, stating that there was "no evidence to support
an argument that there is an anticipated population growth beyond that which can be
accomodated under the present zoning." Id. at -, 341 A.2d at 728-29. See Waynes-
borough Corp. v. Easttown Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 137, 350 A.2d
895 (1976) (discussed in note 37 supra).
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